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CROSSING THE LINE BETWEEN ROUGH REMEDIAL JUS-
TICE AND PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT: CIVIL PENALTY
VIOLATES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE-United States
v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
Abstract: Historically, the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy has been triggered primarily in criminal prosecutions. It has
not encompassed civil monetary penalties. In United States v. Halper,
the Supreme Court expanded double jeopardy protection. The Court
held that government imposition of a civil monetary penalty on a
defendant who has been criminally convicted for the same offense is
punishment to the extent that the penalty clearly exceeds compensation.
The punitive portion of the civil penalty, according to the Court, is mul-
tiple punishment prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Note
examines Halper and its effect on legislatures, prosecutors, and courts.
The Author concludes that the Court's application of double jeopardy
protection effectively protects convicted defendants, but should be
extended to protect acquitted defendants from punitive civil penalties.
In United States v. Halper' the Supreme Court unanimously held
that government imposition of a civil sanction clearly in excess of
compensation is punishment entitling a criminally convicted defend-
ant to the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.2 Under
Halper, when the government seeks a civil penalty after a defendant
has been criminally convicted for the same offense, courts must look
beyond the civil nature of the proceeding and determine whether the
proposed civil sanction is punitive rather than remedial.3 The govern-
ment is entitled to compensation, but government imposition of a
punitive civil sanction on a criminally convicted defendant is, the
Court held, multiple punishment prohibited by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.4
United States v. Halper is a landmark case in the interpretation and
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Protection against multi-
ple punishments before Halper was confined to criminal prosecutions
in which the court determined that the legislature had not clearly
authorized cumulative imposition of the multiple punishments sought
for the offense. Halper is the Supreme Court's first application of the
1. 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
2. Id. at 1902. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1901-02.
4. Id. at 1900-02.
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double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments in a civil
proceeding. The decision expands the courts' role in double jeopardy
analysis. Courts must determine whether a civil sanction that the gov-
ernment seeks to impose on a criminally convicted defendant is reme-
dial or punitive rather than deferring, as in the past, to the legislature's
civil label.
The Court's unprecedented application of double jeopardy protec-
tion raises new issues for legislatures, prosecutors, and courts. Legis-
latures must decide whether the Halper restriction on civil sanctions
requires the restructuring of parallel criminal and civil sanctions to
counter any weakening of their effect. Prosecutors must now consider
double jeopardy implications when parallel civil and criminal actions
are pursued. Also, when the civil action follows criminal conviction
for the same offense, prosecutors must be prepared to account for the
government's costs of investigation and prosecution.
Trial courts also are faced with additional issues after Halper. First,
courts must determine where to draw the line between rough remedial
justice and punishment. Second, they must consider whether other
constitutional protections that have been limited to criminal prosecu-
tions should now apply, like double jeopardy, to punitive civil sanc-
tions. Third, courts must decide whether a qui tam action5 triggers
double jeopardy protection. Finally, courts must prescribe procedures
for combining civil and criminal prosecutions in a single proceeding.
Although Halper raises but fails to resolve many new issues, it is an
important expansion of double jeopardy protection. By recognizing
that civil penalties in excess of compensation constitute punishment
subject to double jeopardy protection, Halper prevents the injustice of
imposing additional punishment on a convicted defendant in a subse-
quent civil proceeding by the government. The decision, however,
does not go far enough because it fails to protect an acquitted criminal
defendant from being punished through government civil sanctions.
Double jeopardy principles demand that all defendants be protected
from multiple attempts by the government to impose punishment.
The Court recognized in Halper that a civil sanction sought by the
government becomes punishment when it clearly exceeds compensa-
tion.6 The Court should further recognize that imposing punishment
5. A qui tam action is "[a]n action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes
a penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be
recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action
and the remainder to the state or some other institution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (5th
ed. 1979).
6. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1901-02.
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on an acquitted defendant also violates the double jeopardy protection
against multiple prosecutions. The Court should therefore limit gov-
ernment recovery in civil proceedings against acquitted defendants to
a remedial level, just as Halper limits civil recovery from convicted
defendants.
I. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment guarantees
that no person "shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."7 The principle of double jeopardy is
one of the oldest legal ideas in western civilization' and is embodied in
all legal systems that claim respect for the individual.' The rationale
underlying the protection is that the state, with all its power and
resources, should not be allowed to subject a defendant to embarrass-
ment, expense, and ordeal by repeated attempts to convict for an
alleged offense. 10
Despite the long history and widespread acceptance of the principle
of double jeopardy,I1 the scope and content of the Double Jeopardy
Clause remain unclear. The principle of double jeopardy is merely a
general concept without definite content until courts or legislatures
supply specific policies.12 Case law supplies these double jeopardy pol-
icies, but even the Supreme Court concedes that its decisions interpret-
ing the Double Jeopardy Clause "can hardly be characterized as
models of consistency and clarity." 3 Indeed, the Court has described
double jeopardy law as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."1 4
Despite the general lack of consistency and clarity in double jeop-
ardy analysis, the Court offers clear guidance on some issues. The
Court does not limit double jeopardy protection to sanctions that liter-
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-52 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 152 (1969).
10. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
11. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1874) ("If there is anything settled in the
jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the
same offense.").
12. J. SIGLER, supra note 9, at 36.
13. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
14. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). Early navigators believed that the
Sargasso Sea, an area of the North Atlantic Ocean, contained a blanket of netted seaweed from
which it was impossible to escape once a ship became entangled. Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476,




ally threaten life or limb, but instead extends the protection to all
criminal penalties.15 In addition, the Court holds that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction, a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal, and multiple punishments for the
same offense. 16
A. Second Prosecution After Conviction
Double jeopardy protection against multiple prosecutions protects a
convicted criminal defendant from being prosecuted more than once
for the same offense, by the same sovereign, in criminal proceedings.
This protection, however, does not guarantee that a defendant will
never be subjected to a second trial for the same offense. A second
trial for the same offense may be allowed if one trial is civil 7 or if the
proceedings are brought by different sovereigns."' Courts consistently
decline to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit subsequent
civil proceedings against criminally convicted defendants where the
civil action is to recover a statutory penalty for the same conduct.1 9
Courts reason that government pursuit of both criminal and civil sanc-
tions for the same offense does not constitute multiple prosecution
because the government, like a private party, is entitled to a remedy
for its losses even if punishment has been imposed.20
The Supreme Court has warned, however, that a civil label is not in
itself conclusive in deciding whether or not the multiple prosecution
protection is triggered.2" Even where Congress has clearly intended to
establish a civil proceeding, courts have inquired further to determine
"whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [Congress'] intention."2 Despite this caveat, how-
ever, the Court has not found a statutory scheme imposing only mone-
15. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 170.
16. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
17. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal acquittal for robbery did not bar
a state trial for a different state offense that prohibited like conduct); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82 (1985) (Alabama prosecution allowed after Kentucky prosecution). The federal government
has a non-binding policy not to prosecute if a similar offense has been or is to be prosecuted in a
state. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27-29 (1977).
19. Annotation, Forfeiture After Acquittal or Conviction, 79 L. Ed. 2d 960, 963 (1986).
20. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399, 401.
21. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956) (civil remedy could be
considered a criminal penalty if "the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in the Act is so
unreasonable or excessive that it transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty").
22. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
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tary penalties to be "criminal" if the legislature labeled the proceeding
"civil., 23
B. Second Prosecution After Acquittal
The Double Jeopardy Clause also protects acquitted defendants
from a second criminal prosecution for the same offense by the same
sovereign. Indeed, an acquittal is accorded special weight.2 4 "The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally pro-
hibits a second criminal trial following an acquittal."2 The special
weight accorded acquittals has not, however, protected acquitted
defendants from subsequent civil proceedings26 or from prosecution by
another sovereign.17
C. Multiple Punishments
In addition to protecting against multiple prosecutions of both con-
victed and acquitted defendants, the Double Jeopardy Clause also bars
multiple punishments for the same offense.2 8 Until Halper, multiple
punishments protection guaranteed only that multiple punishments
could not be imposed for an offense in a single criminal proceeding
unless the legislature had clearly declared its intent to cumulatively
impose the penalties sought for that offense.29 The availability of the
protection hinged upon statutory construction. Thus the multiple
punishments protection prior to Halper operated as a limit on courts
and prosecutors, but not on legislatures.
23. The Court stated that "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960). The Halper decision did not find the statutory scheme to be criminal. It held that the
penalty as applied to Halper constituted punishment. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892,
1904 (1989).
24. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980).
25. Id. "An acquitted defendant may not be retried even though 'the acquittal was based
upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."' Id. (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S.
142, 143 (1962)).
26. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) ("That acquittal on a criminal charge is
not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts
on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled.").
27. See supra note 18 (discussing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)).
28. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Although the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not specifically prohibit multiple punishments, the Court has held that "[ilt is very
clearly the spirit of the [Constitution] to prevent a second punishment under judicial proceedings
for the same crime. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1874). "The Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from
being twice tried for it." Id. at 173.
29. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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In United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court expanded multiple
punishments protection by applying it, for the first time, in a civil pro-
ceeding. In doing so, the Court analyzed the effect of the penalty in an
individual case rather than determining whether the legislature
authorized multiple punishments for the offense.
II. UNITED STATES V HALPER
A. Facts and Lower Court Disposition
Irwin Halper was the manager of a medical laboratory that served
patients eligible for federal Medicare benefits.3" In 1982 and 1983,
Halper inflated sixty-five claims for reimbursement to increase receipts
nine dollars per claim. His fraud netted the laboratory a total of
$585."1 Halper was convicted under the federal criminal false claims
statute.32 He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. 3 3
The government subsequently brought action under the civil False
Claims Act 34 (Act) for the same frauds. 35 The district court granted
the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that on the
basis of his criminal conviction Halper was collaterally estopped from
denying liability in the civil action.36
Under the strict terms of the remedial provision of the Act, it
appeared that Halper would be liable for a civil penalty of double the
government's $585 loss, the costs of the action, and $130,000 ($2,000
for each of the sixty-five false claims). 37 The district court, however,
declined to impose the full civil penalty, declaring that "the total
amount necessary to make the Government whole bears no rational
relation to the $130,000 penalty the Government seeks.", 38 The court
concluded that because Halper had been punished criminally and the
penalty exceeded a remedial level, the civil penalty qualified as multi-
30. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1895 (1989).
31. Id. at 1896.
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 287 (West 1969).
33. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1896.
34. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-31 (West 1969). From 1863 until 1986, the civil False Claims Act
provided that for each offense a violator was "liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government
sustain[ed] because of the act of that person and costs of the civil action." 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729
(West 1983). Congress increased the civil penalty in 1986 to between $5,000 and $10,000 for
each offense, plus triple damages and costs. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 1989).
35. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1896.
36. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, modified, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
37. U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 1983); see supra note 34.
38. Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 533.
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ple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9 The
government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
B. Supreme Court Ruling and Rationale
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the district court that
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits subjecting a defendant who has
been punished in a criminal prosecution to an additional government
civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction is punitive.4 The
Court held that to the degree Halper's statutory penalty exceeded rea-
sonable compensation for the government's losses, the penalty was
punishment and violated the double jeopardy protection against multi-
ple punishments.4 1
The Court acknowledged that previous cases established the civil
nature of proceedings and penalties under the Act. The Court also
acknowledged that a civil remedy does not constitute multiple punish-
ment merely because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of
the government's actual damages.42 According to the Court, however,
the cases that settled those issues neither considered nor "foreclose[d]
the possibility that in a particular case a civil penalty authorized by
the Act [could] be so extreme and so divorced from the Government's
damages and expenses as to constitute punishment."43 Halper, the
Court concluded, was such a case.
The Halper Court recognized that statutory construction is required
to decide whether a proceeding is civil or criminal and to determine
the corresponding constitutional safeguards that are appropriate. 44
The Court found, however, that the statutory construction approach is
"not well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punish-
39. Id. The district court interpreted the Act to mean that the $2000 penalty for each offense
was discretionary, not mandatory, and limited the civil sanction to $16,000. The court estimated
that $16,000 would "reasonably compensate the Government for actual damages as well as
expenses incurred in investigating and prosecuting [the] action." Id. at 534. On motion of the
government, the district court reconsidered its decision and confessed error in ruling that the
$2,000 penalty was not mandatory. United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852, 853-54,
modifying 660 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989). Despite its finding,
the court refused to impose the $130,000 penalty. The court reaffirmed its earlier holding that
the penalty would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and was unconstitutional as applied to
Halper. Id. at 854-855.
40. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989).
41. Id. at 1904.
42. Id. at 1898.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1901.
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ments."' 45 The Court stated that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is intrinsically personal.46 "Its violation can be iden-
tified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed
on the individual by the machinery of the state."47 The purpose and
effect of the sanction must be evaluated rather than the underlying
nature of the proceeding.48 Therefore, whether a penalty is civil or
criminal is not dispositive in assessing whether double jeopardy pro-
tection arises.
The Court held in Halper that double jeopardy protection is trig-
gered when a criminal penalty has been imposed and a subsequent
civil penalty for the same offense exceeds what could reasonably be
regarded as compensation for the government's loss.4 9 When the trial
court finds that a civil penalty sought by the government after criminal
conviction appears to bear no rational relation to the goal of compen-
sating the government for its losses, the defendant is entitled to an
accounting of the government's damages and costs.50 Based on this
accounting, the trial court must determine if the penalty exceeds com-
pensation and therefore constitutes a second punishment. A crimi-
nally convicted defendant can be held liable only for a roughly
compensatory civil penalty. Any additional penalty is punishment
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 The Court limited this
rule to. "the rare case, the case . . . where a fixed-penalty provision
subjects a prolific but small-gauge [previously convicted] offender to a
sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused."52
The Court found that Halper's $130,000 liability for false claims
netting $585 appeared to be such a rare case of overwhelming dispro-
portionality 3 The penalty appeared to bear no rational relation to
the sum of the government's actual loss plus its costs. The Court con-
cluded that the portion of Halper's penalty exceeding reasonable com-
45. Id. (citing United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
46. Id.
47. Id. Double jeopardy protection is triggered only in litigation by the government. Id. at
1903. The Court acknowledged that whether a qui tam action is a private or government action
has not been decided. Id. at n. 11; see supra note 5 (definition of qui tam action).
48. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1901 n.7.




53. Id. at 1904.
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pensation would be an unconstitutional second punishment and could
not be imposed. 4
C. Double Jeopardy Theory Under Halper
The Halper Court's application of multiple punishments protection
to a civil penalty was unprecedented in two respects. First, the Court
had never before found a civil penalty imposed after criminal convic-
tion for the same offense to constitute multiple punishment violative of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, the Court held that legislative
intent (the standard used in all previous multiple punishment inquir-
ies) was not the appropriate standard by which to decide whether a
civil penalty constitutes punishment- of a defendant criminally con--
victed for the same offense. 5 The Court did not preclude multiple
punishments if they are authorized by the legislature and imposed in. a
single proceeding. 6 Nor did the Court preclude multiple proceedings
if one is punitive and the other remedial. But the Halper Court drew
the line at imposing multiple punishments in multiple proceedings.
Halper requires the government to choose between consolidated and
divided criminal and civil prosecutions. The government must seek
and obtain all authorized criminal and civil penalties in one consoli-
dated proceeding or pursue separate civil and criminal actions in
which the civil sanctions cannot exceed reasonable compensation.
Full civil sanctions, even if they are punitive, remain available after
criminal acquittal and when the government chooses not to criminally
prosecute.57
III. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS PROTECTION AFTER
HALPER
The Court significantly expanded its application of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause in United States v. Halper. The Halper Court recognized
the injustice of imposing punitive civil penalties on a defendant with-
out considering the criminal penalties already assessed for the same
offense. In response, the Court applied the double jeopardy protection
against multiple punishments for the first time to parallel criminal and
civil penalties. This unprecedented application of double jeopardy the-
54. Id. at 1903-1904. The Court vacated the district court's decision not to impose any part
of the penalty and remanded the case to permit the government to present an accounting of its
actual costs and to recover those demonstrated costs. Id.
55. Id. at 1901.
56. Id. at 1903"n.10.
57. See id. at 1903. Multiple punishments protection is not implicated because there has been
no previous punishment. See id.
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ory affects not only defendants, but legislatures, prosecutors, and
courts.
A. Impact on Legislatures
Halper affects legislatures by restricting their power to determine
civil sanctions unilaterally. Prior to Halper, courts consistently
deferred to legislative intent and did not impose any constitutional
limits on the application of legislatively authorized civil monetary
sanctions. Halper requires that courts limit the imposition of civil
sanctions prescribed by the legislature when the defendant in a govern-
ment civil action has been criminally convicted and the legislatively
authorized civil sanction is disproportionate to the government's
losses.
Congress now must consider whether to respond by restructuring
the criminal and civil fraud sanctions to counter any judicial weaken-
ing of the sanctions' effect. Congress, in its anticrime effort, has
increased penalties 8 and courts have begun imposing civil fines
exceeding one million dollars. 9 In 1986 and 1987, Congress signifi-
cantly increased penalties in both the criminal and civil false claims
statutes.60 Congress amended the statutes after determining that more
severe sanctions were needed in order to combat rampant fraud
against the government.6" It is ironic, or perhaps instructive, that the
Court's restriction on civil recovery in Halper followed closely behind
these amendments. Congress may respond to Halper by increasing the
monetary sanctions recoverable in a criminal proceeding. This would
compensate the government for the loss of civil sanctions in excess of
"rough remedial justice." Increased criminal sanctions, however,
58. Congress increased the civil false claims sanctions in 1986 and the criminal sanctions in
1987. The criminal sanctions for each offense now include up to five years in prison and a fine of
up to $250,000 for an individual, $500,000 for an organization, and $1,000,000 if a defense
contract is involved. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 287, 3571 (West Supp. 1989); see supra note 34 (1986 civil
amendments).
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fahner v. Alaska, 591 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. I11. 1984) (federal
government and Illinois each impose civil penalties in excess of one million dollars on doctor for
more than 500 False Claims Act frauds).
60. See supra notes 34, 58. Halper's fixed penalty under the new civil statute would have been
$325,000 to $650,000 plus treble damages and costs. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 1989). His
criminal penalty would have been up to five years and $250,000 per offense. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 287,
3571 (West Supp. 1989). Federal prosecutors obtained ten times the amount in civil fraud
judgments and settlements in fiscal year 1989 as in fiscal year 1985. Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1989, at
B8, col. 6.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1986).
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would be subject to the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
eighth amendment,62 which has not been applied to civil sanctions.63
B. Impact on Prosecutors
The Halper decision also raises new issues for prosecutors. The gov-
ernment now must decide, in cases with parallel criminal and civil
actions, which of three options to pursue. First, the government could
continue to seek criminal and civil sanctions separately (recognizing
that a criminal conviction would limit the civil sanction to compensa-
tion). Second, it could prosecute the criminal and civil claims in the
same proceeding. Third, it could forego criminal prosecution in order
to seek full statutory civil penalties."
Under the first option, prosecutors must coordinate civil and crimi-
nal actions to prevent the civil action from barring the criminal case.65
Prosecutors could seek to stay the civil case pending the criminal out-
come or could seek a civil penalty limited to compensation and dam-
ages in order to avoid barring the criminal action. Either solution
requires coordination between civil and criminal prosecutions that was
unnecessary prior to Halper.
Further, under Halper, both the first and second options require the
government to account for its costs of detection, investigation, and
prosecution if the relation between those costs and the legislatively
authorized civil sanction is challenged. While the extent of this bur-
den is not yet clear, government agents and prosecutors would be well
advised to keep records of time and costs for each action in case the
court requires an accounting to determine compensation. No guide-
lines have been established to indicate whether compensable govern-
ment costs must be tied directly to the defendant and the offense in the
instant case or if the government can offer proof of its expenses for
combatting fraud generally and assign a share to the defendant. The
government might avoid the necessity of a cost accounting by seeking
62. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, eg., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
(the eighth amendment forbids the legislature from authorizing a penalty that is disproportionate
to the offense).
63. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912 (1989).
64. For maximum deterrent effect, the government could reserve the third option primarily
for corporate offenders.
65. The Halper rationale implies that the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar a criminal
action if a punitive civil penalty had been imposed for the same offense.
447
Washington Law Review
less than the full statutory penalty66 in cases where that penalty seems
disproportionate to costs. 6 7
C. Impact on Courts
1. Courts Must Apply the Halper Rule on a Case-by-Case Basis
In addition to its impact on legislatures and prosecutors, Halper
impacts the courts in several significant respects. Because Halper
offers courts no clear guidelines for determining at what point "rough
remedial justice" becomes "clear injustice" and renders a penalty
unconstitutional as applied, courts will have to make this determina-
tion on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that ascertaining the govern-
ment's actual loss due to fraud may be difficult if not impossible. 68
Even when a false claim nets the defendant little or no gain, investigat-
ing and prosecuting the fraudulent activity may prove extremely
costly. Recognizing the difficulty of proving government losses and
costs, the Court has long accepted double and triple damages, as well
as civil penalty provisions that effectively operate as liquidated dam-
ages clauses, without requiring a strict accounting.69 Similarly, the
Halper Court rejected a strict accounting requirement for penalties
imposed for one or two offenses. The Court declared in dictum that
the rational-relation test, which requires the penalty to be proportional
to the government's costs and losses, is automatically met if there are
only one or two offenses.7 ° Loss accounting is necessary, according to
Halper, only when the sanction is overwhelmingly disproportionate to
the losses. 7'
The Court did not, however, offer guidance on how to determine at
what point the penalty becomes disproportionate. The Court referred
to Halper's statutorily authorized penalty as a "stark situation ...
where the recovery is exponentially greater than the amount of the
fraud."72 But the Court went on to state that the rational-relationship
requirement would be met if only one or two false claims were
66. The government interprets the Act to allow the government discretion to pursue less than
the full penalty. See United States v. Greenberg, 237 F. Supp. 439, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
67. Courts may be less inclined to find that the proposed penalty bears no rational relation to
the government's costs in such a case and thus less likely to require cost accounting.
68. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989) (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1956)).
69. Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at 151-53.
70. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903 n. 12 ("It hardly seems necessary to state that a suit under the
Act alleging one or two false claims would satisfy the rational-relationship requirement.").
71. Id. at 1902.
72. Id. at 1900.
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involved."3 The ratio of actual loss to statutory penalty, however, is
the same for one or two offenses as it is for Halper's sixty-five false
claims. 74 A simple ratio test, therefore, is not adequate.
The Court also stated that "it is only when a sizable number of false
claims is present that the issue of double jeopardy may arise." 7 The
number of offenses for which a person is penalized, however, should
not be the issue upon which double jeopardy protection hinges. It is
more appropriate to consider the total amount of the penalty in rela-
tion to the damage suffered by the government as determinative of the
difference between compensation and punishment. The Court's dic-
tum that "a suit under the Act alleging one or two false claims would
satisfy the rational-relation requirement"' 76 would not necessarily be
followed if Congress raised the civil penalty for each offense to
$100,000 and, as in Halper, the government's loss was nine dollars per
offense plus costs. 7 7 Thus, Halper fails to provide courts with a bright
line test to determine the difference between permissible compensation
and prohibited punishment. The line will have to be drawn on a case-
by-case basis whenever, regardless of the number of offenses, the
defendant has been criminally punished and the question is raised
whether the statutorily prescribed civil penalty exceeds the amount
that can reasonably be considered compensation for the government's
loss.
Although Halper does not establish a bright line between compensa-
tion and punishment, it is still a valuable addition to the Court's appli-
cation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Halper extends multiple
punishments protection beyond criminal trials to also protect crimi-
nally convicted defendants in civil trials.
2. Courts Must Determine Whether Other Constitutional Safeguards
Are Triggered when Punitive Sanctions Are Imposed in
Civil Proceedings
The Court's unprecedented recognition of a civil monetary penalty
as punishment invoking double jeopardy protection also raises the
question whether other constitutional protections should be available
when punitive sanctions are imposed by the government in civil pro-
73. See supra note 70.
74. $9/$2,000 = $18/$4,000 = $585/$130,000.
75. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903 n.12.
76. Id.
77. The Court is probably referring to the penalties in the Act before and/or after 1986 and is
recognizing penalties from $2,000 to $20,000 to be reasonable "liquidated damages" for the cost
of investigating and prosecuting one or two offenses.
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ceedings. By recognizing the proposed sanction in Halper as punish-
ment that triggers double jeopardy protection, but allowing its
application when a criminal conviction for the same offense is not
involved, the Court implicitly conceded that civil courts can and do
impose punishment. This recognition of excessive civil monetary pen-
alties as punishment will undoubtedly lead defendants to argue that
courts should apply other constitutional safeguards previously applied
only in criminal proceedings to punitive government civil actions. The
Court, for example, has not applied the protection of the Excessive
Fines Clause of the eighth amendment"8 in civil proceedings. Until
Halper, both double jeopardy and excessive fines protections were lim-
ited to criminal prosecutions.7 9 Extension of the Halper rationale to
excessive fines analysis would require that the effect of the fine be
examined to determine if it is solely remedial. The Halper Court wrote
that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a reme-
dial purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."8 ° Any government
civil sanction exceeding "rough remedial justice," therefore, is punish-
ment and may qualify for the constitutional protection of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause.81
The decision to consider civil sanctions in excess of compensation as
punishment for purposes of analysis under the Double Jeopardy
Clause may open the door to application of other constitutional safe-
guards in government civil proceedings when the penalty is punitive
rather than remedial.
3. Courts Must Decide Whether Qui Tam Actions Are Within the
Halper Rule
Another question raised and left unanswered by the Halper Court is
whether a qui tam action is a government action subject to double
78. See supra note 62.
79. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2913 (1989) ("our cases
long have understood [the eighth amendment] to apply primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to
criminal prosecutions and punishments"); United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
548-49 (1943) ("the Court ...emphasized the line between civil, remedial actions brought
primarily to protect the government from financial loss and actions intended to authorize
criminal punishment to vindicate public justice. Only the latter subject the defendant to
'jeopardy' within the constitutional meaning.").
80. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
81. The Court recognized that its rationale in Halper "implies that punitive damages
awarded to the government in a civil action may raise Eighth Amendment concerns." Browning-
Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920 n.21. Application of eighth amendment protection to government civil
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jeopardy protection or a private action to which double jeopardy pro-
tections do not apply.8" The Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess assumed, but did not decide, that a qui tam action could give rise
to double jeopardy protection if the government's share of the judg-
ment did "more than afford the government complete indemnity for
the injuries done it."83 The Halper Court, noting that Hess had not
decided the issue, also declined to resolve it.84
Qui tam actions should be considered government actions subject to
double jeopardy scrutiny. There are several indications that qui tam
actions are government rather than private actions. First, an informer
who sues under a qui tam provision is suing for a wrong done to the
government, not to any private party. Second, qui tam actions are
intended by the legislature to expand the government's ability to pros-
ecute wrongdoing directed at the government by rewarding informers.
They are not primarily for the benefit of the informer. Finally, most of
the recovery goes to the government with the qui tam informer receiv-
ing only a portion of the recovery as a reward for initiating the suit."
Thus a qui tam action should be considered a government action in
which the government pays an informer for aiding the prosecution.
The Court should consider the informer's portion of the penalty to be
one of the government's costs of detecting, investigating, and prosecut-
ing the action. The government would then be allowed full indemnity
(including reimbursement for the informer's share of the recovery)
before the civil sanction could be considered to have crossed the line
between remedy and punishment.
If qui tam actions are held to be government actions subject to
double jeopardy protection, restrictions may be necessary to avoid
allowing qui tam actions to bar criminal prosecutions.86 The possibil-
ity of a qui-tam action barring criminal prosecution might encourage
sweetheart actions in which a potential defendant could get a straw
man to sue him or her to avoid criminal prosecution. One solution
would be to require that a qui tam action fied for an offense that has
not, been criminally prosecuted be allowed to proceed only if the gov-
ernment certifies that no criminal action is intended against the
defendant for the offense.
82. Halper 109 S. Ct. at 1903 n. 11; see supra note 5 (definition of qui tam action).
83. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943).
84. Halper, 109 S. CL at 1903 n.ll.
85. Under the False Claims Act qui tam provisions, an informer receives from 15% to 30%
of any government recovery. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1989).
86. Such a bar would result if the civil action preceded the criminal action and imposed a
sanction greater than that required to indemnify the government.
Washington Law Review
The designation of qui tam actions as government actions for pur-
poses of double jeopardy analysis admittedly would reduce the incen-
tive for qui tam informers to aid the government in parallel criminal
prosecutions.87 This disincentive for qui tam informers to aid in the
criminal prosecution does not, however, preclude government criminal
action and should not deter the courts from designating qui tam
actions as government actions. The government can proceed crimi-
nally without the voluntary aid of the qui tam informer if its own evi-
dence warrants, or it can seek evidence and testimony from the
informer through discovery and subpoenas. If criminal prosecution is
not warranted or is unsuccessful, the government can rely on the qui
tam action for full civil penalties to provide compensation and the
enforcement needed to bolster deterrence. Therefore, although the
Halper Court declined to resolve the issue, qui tam actions should fall
within the Halper rule and trigger double jeopardy protection.
4. Courts Must Specify How to Combine Criminal and Civil
Prosecutions in a Single Proceeding
The Halper Court stated that the government could seek and obtain
"both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized
criminal penalties in the same proceeding,"88 but the Court did not
specify how to combine the civil and criminal actions in one proceed-
ing. It remains unclear how the differences between civil and criminal
procedures would be accommodated in a single proceeding.
It is unlikely, in suggesting a single proceeding, that the Court envi-
sioned a new hybrid criminal-civil trial with varying burdens of proof,
rules of procedure, and constitutional protections. It is equally
unlikely that the Court envisioned imposing criminal punishment in a
civil proceeding. It is most likely, therefore, that the Court was
encouraging the imposition of all sanctions for an offense, including
compensation, in the criminal prosecution.
A combined civil-criminal prosecution could be implemented
through court rules allowing the government, after a defendant is con-
victed, to submit the civil sanctions for that offense to the judge to be
considered jointly with the criminal sanctions for sentencing. Because
defendants in a civil suit are collaterally estopped from denying liabil-
ity when they have been criminally convicted for the same offense, this
87. A criminal conviction could reduce the civil recovery, which the qui tam informer would
otherwise be entitled to share, because that recovery would be limited under Halper to a remedial
level.
88. Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903.
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rule would not deprive defendants of due process" and would be
within the double jeopardy requirement that multiple punishments be
imposed in a single proceeding. If a defendant were acquitted, the
government still could pursue a civil prosecution.9"
IV. HALPER: A PARTIAL SOLUTION THAT SHOULD BE
EXTENDED TO PROTECT ACQUITTED
DEFENDANTS
The Halper Court forged a new and necessary rule when it extended
application-of the Double Jeopardy Clause to include punishment in a
civil proceeding. In so doing, the Court prevented the injustice of
imposing punitive civil sanctions when punishment for the same
offense previously was exacted in a criminal prosecution. The Court,
however, did not go far enough. The Court chose the multiple punish-
ments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect convicted
defendants threatened with punitive civil penalties. While this choice
of label offers protection to convicted defendants like Halper, multiple
punishments protection does not protect acquitted defendants from
being subsequently punished in a government civil proceeding.
Acquitted defendants arguably are more deserving of protection
from continuing government prosecution than are those who are
found guilty.91 Resting the double jeopardy analysis on the protection
against multiple punishments, however, provides more protection for
the guilty defendant than for the innocent. It is possible under Halper
for an acquitted defendant to be prosecuted twice and to be more
heavily punished than a convicted defendant.92
The Court's real concern in Halper was not multiple punishments: it
was multiple prosecutions. This is evident from the fact that the
Court authorized imposition of the cumulative civil and criminal pen-
alties prescribed by the legislature as long as they are imposed in a
single proceeding. The Court probably preferred multiple punish-
ments analysis over multiple prosecutions analysis because of the
89. The Court held in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987), that the seventh
amendment does not require a jury trial to determine a civil penalty.
90. See supra note 26.
91. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
92. As the Government pointed out in its reply brief:
[A] defendant who is convicted in a criminal case, but receives a suspended sentence or a
fine smaller than his prospective civil penalties, is better off than a defendant who is
acquitted of criminal charges, for the former but not the latter would be able to claim the
protection of double jeopardy in a subsequent civil action for "punitive" damages.
Reply Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989) (No. 87-
1383).
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courts' long-standing approval of parallel criminal and civil proceed-
ings, and the courts' belief in the right of the government to be com-
pensated for its losses. 93 The Court may have believed that the
government's right to civil remedies would be better protected by bar-
ring an excessive civil penalty as prohibited punishment rather than as
prohibited prosecution. This right, however, need not be compro-
mised by recognizing the double jeopardy dilemma in Halper as a mul-
tiple prosecutions rather than multiple punishments issue.
The principles of double jeopardy demand that the Court bar gov-
ernment imposition of civil penalties in excess of compensation on
acquitted as well as convicted defendants. The Halper decision recog-
nizes that when the government seeks a civil penalty in excess of rough
remedial justice from a convicted defendant, the government is seeking
again to punish the defendant. The Court applies the multiple punish-
ments protection to prevent this injustice. A better solution is to rec-
ognize that when the government seeks to punish any criminally
prosecuted defendant in a civil proceeding, the government is violating
the multiple prosecutions protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The line between remedy and punishment also should be the line
between civil and criminal prosecution. The double jeopardy protec-
tion against multiple prosecutions would therefore require that the
government be precluded from imposing any civil penalty beyond
compensation on either acquitted or convicted defendants.
In Halper, the Court limited, but did not bar, the government's
recovery. The Court recognized that the statutory remedy was not in
itself criminal punishment, but would constitute punishment as
applied to Halper. Similarly, the Court should recognize that govern-
ment pursuit of a civil remedy does not constitute multiple prosecu-
tion in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but imposition of a
sanction beyond compensation would undermine the civil nature of
the proceeding and transform the proceeding into criminal prosecu-
tion. Such prosecution would be barred by the multiple prosecutions
protection if the defendant had been criminally convicted or acquitted,
thus limiting the civil penalty to a remedial level. This proposed
approach offers double jeopardy protection to an acquitted defendant
equivalent to that offered a convicted defendant under Halper. It is
therefore more consistent than the Halper approach with previous
applications of the double jeopardy principle that have accorded
acquitted defendants all protections provided to convicted defendants.
93. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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The proposed solution would not preclude civil recovery by the gov-
ernment from any defendant. It would merely limit the civil sanctions
imposed on a defendant who has been either convicted or acquitted in
a criminal proceeding, as the Halper decision does for those convicted,
to a level commensurate with the government's losses and costs. 94
V. CONCLUSION
The Court recognized in Halper that a penalty imposed in a govern-
ment civil proceeding is punitive if it exceeds reasonable compensa-
tion, and that any such punishment is prohibited by the Double
Jeopardy Clause if the defendant has been criminally convicted for the
same offense. The Court held, however, that all legislatively author-
ized penalties, both civil and criminal, could be imposed in a single
proceeding.
This decision does not prohibit multiple prosecutions as long as one
is civil and the other is criminal, and it does not prohibit multiple
punishments as long as they are authorized by the legislature and
imposed in a single proceeding. It does require that the government
choose between pursuing multiple proceedings or multiple
punishments.
The effect of the Halper decision is to expand the application of
double jeopardy protection beyond criminal prosecutions to include
punitive civil monetary penalties sought by the government. This
expansion raises questions that must be answered by legislatures, pros-
ecutors, and courts as the new rule is applied. Application of the new
rule, however, only partially solves the problem of defendants subject
to punishment in both civil and criminal proceedings. The Halper rule
does not go far enough because it does not provide double jeopardy
protection for acquitted defendants on whom the government seeks to
impose punitive civil sanctions. It is an injustice to guarantee more
protection in a subsequent civil proceeding to convicted defendants
than to acquitted defendants.
The Court should extend the double jeopardy protection in govern-
ment civil actions that Halper guarantees to criminally convicted
defendants to include criminally acquitted defendants as well. The
Court could do so by recognizing that a civil proceeding becomes a
94. The issue remains, but is outside the scope of this Note, whether the government should
be able to punish any defendant in a civil proceeding. A decision to limit civil penalties for all
defendants to a remedial level, as is required for convicted defendants under Halper and is
proposed for acquitted defendants in this Note, would have to be based on a principle other than
double jeopardy.
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criminal prosecution when the sanction to be imposed on behalf of the
government exceeds compensation and becomes punishment. The
government would therefore be limited under the multiple prosecu-
tions protection to a compensatory civil sanction, but its right to be
made completely whole would be preserved. The double jeopardy
guarantee against multiple prosecutions would protect both convicted
and acquitted defendants from being punished in a civil proceeding by
limiting government civil recoveries against them to a compensatory
level.
Lynn C Hall
